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ABSTRACT 
Riparian Zone Protection: The Use of the Willingness-to-
Accept Format in a Contingent Valuation Study 
by 
Catherine A. Broadhead, Doctor of Philosophy 
Utah State University, 2000 
Major Professor: Basudeb Biswas 
Department: Economics 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is used to evaluate the minimum 
compensation landowners require to forego production on farm riverbank areas . The 
elic itation format used in the survey is a yes-no panicipation question followed by an 
open-ended question. 
Chapter 2 presents the results of the survey. The Heckman approach is used in the 
econometric analysis to take care of the self-select ion problem arising with this 
fo rmatting of the questions. Chapter 3 is devoted to further examining the potential for 
undertaking valuation exercises using the willingness-to-accept format {WT A) 
WT A estimates obtained with open-ended format are compared to WT A estimates 
obtained when respondents are placed in a "contingent first-price sealed-bid auction" 
setting. Results indicate that WT A values obtained in the two different settings were 
not statistically different. More generally, this chapter shows that the use of auctions 
iii 
iv 
can be successfully applied to the provision of publjc goods in the case of compensation 
demanded. 
(100 pages) 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 encouraged 
participating countries to be more aware and eager to tackle environmental problems 
they all faced, including global warming, forest preservation, and animal and plant 
preservation. At approximately the same time in Europe, the Common Agricultural 
Policy took a new turn by attempting to incorporate environmental issues such as 
pollution problems associated with farming practice as policy. The reform it produced 
was based on a system of direct payments to farmers to either reduce pollutants or to 
cease production on selected lands . 
In 1997, a study was financed by the French Ministry of the Environment to 
evaluate the costs of preserving riparian habitat on the banks of the Garonne River, in 
the southwest of France. This study was undertaken to assess the cost through foregone 
harvests and site management to landowners resulting from the implementation of the 
preservation program along the river that would require landowners to leave more idle 
land on the riverbanks. 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) was used to study households that 
currently own land on the banks of the river. The CVM is an empirical technique used 
to measure environmental benefits or costs due to a change in a nonmarket good or 
environmental qualiry. This method has become one of the most widely used 
nonmarket valuation techniques over the past years. Its predominance is due to its 
flexibility and ability to estimate total value, including nonuse value. It was necessary 
to use this nonmarket technique to evaluate both out-of-pocket and psychological costs 
included in the overall cost to owners participating in the preservation program. 
Another important aim of this study was to evaluate the accuracy of the 
willingness-to-accept (WTA) format in the CVM by comparing simple WTA estimates 
with WT A values obtained in a contingent first-price , sealed-bid auction. 
2 
The first essay presents the results of this study, which found that the CVM can be 
successfully applied in the case of offered compensation. In effect, respondents give 
very "reasonable values" close to the market rental cost ofland. The econometric 
analysis undertaken reveals a systematic association between various socioeconomic 
variables of interest and the expressed WTA format for foregone land use . 
The second essay takes us one step further, as we evaluate the use of the WTA 
format in the CVM. We compare mean WTA estimates obtained with the simple open-
format model with those obtained with a first-price, sealed-bid auction. 
Results indicate that respondents placed in the auction setting gave lower WTA 
measures for both farmers and nonfarmer groups. The mean WTA measures, however, 
do not appear to be statistically significantly different. In other words, the "simple" 
open-format WTA measures determined in this study were very close to individuals' 
true values as measured by the auction format setting. 
CHAPTER2 
RIPARIAl ZONE PROTECT!O FOR DETERMTN1NG 
COMPENSATION REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW 
LAND FROM PRODUCTIVE USE1 
Abstract 
The Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is used to study households that 
currently own land on the banks of the river. More precisely, a willingness-to-accept 
(WT A) format was used to estimate the loss to owners for no longer being able to farm 
riverbank areas. Results indicate that the CVM can be successfully applied in the case 
of offered compensation. The econometric analysis undertaken reveals a systematic 
association between various socioeconomic variables of interest and the expressed 
WT A format for foregone land use. 
Introduction 
The United Nations conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 encouraged participating 
countries to be more aware and eager to tackle environmental problems they all faced, 
including global warming, forest preservation, and animal and plant preservation. At 
approximately the same time in Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy took a new 
tum, by anempting to incorporate environmental issues, such as pollution problems 
1Coauthored by Catherine Broadhead and John Keith. 
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associated with farming practice as policy. The reform it produced was based on a 
system of direct payments to farmers to eitber reduce pollutants or to cease production 
on lands deemed to be environmentally sensitive (Bonnieux and Rainelli, 1996). 
In 1997, a study was financed by the French Ministry of Environment to evaluate 
the costs of protecting riparian habitat on the banks of the Garonne River. The 
Contingent Valuation Method (CVM) is used to study households that currently own 
land on the banks of tbe river. More precisely, a willingness-to-accept (WTA) format 
was used to estimate the loss to owners for no longer being able to farm riverbank 
areas. Results of this study are reported and analyzed in this paper. 
4 
The CVM is an empirical technique often used to measure environmental benefits 
due to a change in a nonmarket good or environmental quality. This method has 
become one of the most widely used nonmarket valuation techniques over the past 
years. Its predominance is due to its flexibility and ability to estimate total value, 
including non-use value. Most of the time, the willingness-to-pay (WTP) approach is 
chosen, though often in different formats (i.e., closed-ended, open, iterative bidding). 
Due to the nature of the allocation of property right in this case, WTP fails to measure 
the costs of foregone use on privately owned land. In effect, the pre-survey used to 
determine how land-use rights were distributed indicates that those rights were strongly 
perceived by landowners. It would have been politically very difficult to ask owners 
their WTP for an imposed foregone use on land they considered their own. This 
formatting of the question would have led owners to believe that they were not free to 
use their land the way they choose to. The alternative measure of WT A allows us to 
capture this cost. 
5 
Relatively few CVM studies have been conducted using this format (Kunreuther 
et al., 1987; Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996), primarily because of lack of upper bound 
in the minimum compensation demanded. This problem is handled in the current study 
by using a discrete/continuous choice model. The questionnaire is designed in such a 
way that extreme values are automatically screened out. This paper seeks to explore 
further the potential for undertaking valuation exercises using the WT A format. 
Study Site 
Ecologists agree on the important role played by riparian forests along rivers. 
Important functions include flooding mitigation, temporary reservoirs, stock of water 
surplus the river is unable to evacuate at any given time, bank erosion prevention, water 
quality improvement by filtering nitrates and other compounds from run-off, and preserve 
habitat for plant and animal species (Buckley, 1989; Cattan and Laurans, 1996). 
Expanded urbanization, as well as some current farming practices, has resulted in 
deforestation along the Garonne River (DeCamps, 1987). The site under study begins 
north of Toulouse and continues approximately 100 krn downstream in the direction of 
Bordeaux (see map in Appendix A). This is mainly a rural zone, except along the 
outskirts of Toulouse. There are approximately 300 households who own land along 
the length of the river. These households typically sub-rent, farm, or live on the land, 
or some combination of the three. Often a small strip ofland along the river is already 
6 
left unused. Since the Garonne River is part of France's "Domanial Rivers" (meaning 
they are in the State's eminent domain), owners are legally required to leave a strip of 
land of3 meters unused as a right of way. Sometimes owners leave more than 3 meters 
along the river's edge in order to reduce land flooding or bank destruction, which 
effectively reduces their lot size. The preservation program in this study suggests that 
owners expand that strip of land left untouched. 
For those who utilize the land right up to the river bank, any widening of the 
right-of-way due to the proposed preservation program may represent an important 
economic loss, while this economic loss may be insignificant for those who do not use 
it. Thus, we would expect the latter group to indicate lower WTA values. 
Theory and Method 
Theoretical Framework 
ln our model, we consider that agricultural land provides a variety of "non-
market" services, including wildlife habitat, scenic vistas, and recreation. While 
landowners can obtain revenue from the use, sale, or development of agricultural land, 
no revenue can normally be derived from the externalities provided by agricultural 
land. As a consequence, it may be undervalued by the market (Halstead, 1984). 
Therefore, we take into account the dual characteristic of land as a production factor 
(farming) and as a consumption good (collecting minor products like dead wood for 
heating, but also as residential space, garden, yard), and consider that owners derive an 
economic rent from the services by this factor for which there is a positive market 
demand (Just eta!., 1982). 
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For simplicity, we assume that there are only two ways an individual can allocate 
the land they own--they can either leave it idle or else produce. Idle land provides 
utili ty to the individual, such as the enjoyment of the sight and the protection of riparian 
habitat for animals and plants. If, on the other hand, the owner decides to use the land 
for production, the individual gets rent in return which allows for the purchase of 
goods and services. We make the assumption here that the preservation program 
cannot represent an increase in welfare. Accepting to widen the strip of land left 
untouched would result in a loss of welfare for landowners. If it did not, landowners 
interested in riparian preservation would have widened the unused port ion of land on 
thei r own. The total amount of land is assumed to be fixed. The individual is faced 
with the choice of buying different bundles of goods (C) at a given price p (nonnalized 
to one) and enjoying her idle land (H) with the rent on land (w) as its price. 
where L represents the total amount of land owned by the river, and RL represents 
productive land. 
Let the utility function be: 
utility= U(C, H) 
The individual can purchase consumption items (C) by allocating some land to 
(!) 
(2) 
productive use. The income comes from productive land, as well as from some 
exogenous income(!\} If the yearly rental price on productive land (per hectare) is 
given by w, the income constraint is then given by 
C = wRL + N 
Rewriting the budget constraint directly in terms of C and H, we have 
C = w(L- H)-~ 
or 
C + wH = wL + N = V 
8 
(3) 
(4a) 
(4b) 
The quantity wL + N represents the total purchasing power available to 
individuals. It is often called their "full income" (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
Individuals can allocate their land to productive use (for real income and consumption 
C) or leave it idle and get benefits from it, like sightseeing for example. They get 
utility from the benefits associated wi th owning a lot by the river. Equation 4 shows 
that the opportunity cost of enjoying idle land is w per year and per hectare--it is equal 
to earnings foregone by not producing on the lots. Further, we assume that productivity 
on the land is homogenous. In other words, land is found to be as productive on the 
river's edge as it is deeper in the lot and therefore w is constant. 
Setting up the Lagrangean, 
l£ = U(C,H) + _A.(w L + N- C- wH) 
The first-order condition for a maximum solution is 
oL!oC = 6U/6C - A = 0 
6L16H = 6U/6H - w A. = 0 
Combining Eqs. (6) and (7), 
(6U/6C)/(6U/6H) = w 
9 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
In order to maximize utility, given the real rental price, w, the individual will , therefore, 
choose to produce on that amount of land for which the marginal rate of substitution 
(MRS) of idle land for consumption (C) is equal tow. We will assume for convenience 
that the MRS of idle land for consumption is diminishing (second derivative is 
negative). 
Solving for Eqs. (6) and (7), we obtain the Marshallian demand functions for idle 
land . A change in w can then be analyzed in a manner identical to a change in price in 
the consumer case. By totally differentiating the demand functions , we are able to 
show the two effects at work: the substitution and the income effects. When w 
increases, the opportunity cost of idle land rises. The individual must give up more in 
lost rent for each hectare of land being idle. The substitution effect of an increase in w 
on the amount of idle land will therefore be negative. As idle land becomes more 
expensive, there is reason to supply less of it. Assuming that idle land is a normal 
10 
good, the income effect o f an increase in w on idle land is positive. As w increases, the 
individual can afford having more of it. Thus the substitution and income effects work 
in opposite directions. 
Since the total amount of land L is assumed to be fixed , deriving the demand for 
idle land is equivalent to deriving the supply for productive land ~(w,N) . The amount 
of land for production depends on both the rent and on the amount of real exogenous 
income received. Since idle land is considered as being a normal good, as N increases, 
the demand for idle land H increases, and therefore the supply of productive land 
decreases or, more formally, oR; oN < 0. 
To study the effect of rent change on productive land supply (o~/ow) we can also 
consider the dual problem to the indi vidual 's primary utility-maximizing problem. We 
minimize the "full" expenditure (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). 
C = w(L - H) .._ = V (9) 
or 
V = C- wRL = N (see Eq. 3) (10) 
s. to 
U=U(C, H) (!!) 
Solving tills minimizing problem will yield to the same results as solving the utility-
maximizing problem. 
Sf= C- wRL + A.(U(C,H)) 
II 
(I 2) 
We can now apply the envelope theorem to the minimum value for these extra 
expenditures calculated in the dual problem, and we obtain the compensated demand 
for idle land. 
dSf/ow = oV/ow =- RL (13) 
The idle land demand Eq. is given by (13) using H = L- RL. Since utility is held 
constant in the dual expenditure minimizing approach, Eq. 13 should be interpreted as a 
"compensated" (constant utili ty) productive land supply function , which we will denote 
by R',(w,U) to differentiate it from the uncompensated productive land suppl y function 
R',(w, ). 
ow we can use these concepts to derive a Slutsky-type Eq. for the supply of 
productive land RL that reflects the substi tution and income effects that result from 
changes in the real rent. 
Since utility maximization and expenditure minimization must imply the same 
choice, the outlay in the original problem must be the expenditure minimum in the dual 
problem (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). Therefore, we have: 
R'p(w,U) = Rp(w,V(w,U)) (14) 
Quantity supplied is identical fo r the compensated and uncompensated supply functions 
when the individual's income is exactly what is needed to attain the required utility 
level. Above tbat point, the individual's income is increased with the compensated 
supply curve, so more is supplied than with the uncompensated supply curve. 
Panial differentiation of both sides of Eq. (14) with respect tow yields 
o R'! ow = o R!6w + o R.ioV. oV/ow 
using the envelope theorem from ( 1 0), we have: 
o R'p/ow = o R!6w - RL . o R!6V 
12 
(15) 
( 16) 
Introducing a slightly different notation for the compensated productive land function, 
(17) 
and rearranging terms gives the final Slutsky Eq. for productive land supply: 
(18) 
where 0 R!Ow/u-uo represents the substitution effect in which utility is held constant, and 
RL . o R!OV represents the income effect, which is analytically equivalent to an 
appropriate change in exogenous income. The substitution effect was negative for idle 
land, and hence is positive for productive land. Higher rent leads to an increase in 
amount of productive land being supplied. Similarly, the income effect, positive for idle 
land, is now negative, a higher rent allowing the individual to supply less productive land. 
So far, we have looked at the effects of a change in price (w). However, thi s 
preservation program, as often do environmental policies, implies a change in the 
quantity of idle land supplied (an increase in H). By totally differenti ati ng 
13 
V(w) = C- wRL and U. = U(C,H) ( 19) 
We get: 
dV = dC- wdRL - Rldw 
dU. = (6U/6C)dC + (6U/6H)dH 
(20) 
(21) 
To see how a change in idle land H can be compensated by a change in 
expenditure V, so that the individual's utility stays constant (dU. = 0), we can write: 
dC = dV + wdRL 
dC = [-(6U/6H)/(6U/6C)]dH 
Therefore, 
dV = -wdR, - (6U/6H)/(6U/IiC)dH 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
In the case of an imposed increase in H, -(liU/6H)/(6U/6C)dH in Eq. 24 is negative 
[both C and H being normal goods, (6U/6H)>O and (6U/6C)>O], and- wdR, is also 
negative. Change in expenditures must be equal to loss in revenue associated with 
change in the amount of productive land supplied and the value the individual attributes 
to the imposed change in quantity of idle land (H). Participating in a preservation 
program means a loss in utili ty for the individual, since some land is "taken away" from 
production or personal use. The individual is now on a lower level of utili ty (i .e. , Ul). 
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Fig. 2. 1 describes such a situation. lfthe individual is currently using the total 
amount ofland to produce marketable commodities, she is at point A with utility level 
U0 and gets Y0 amount of revenue. If, on the other hand, the individual prefers to enjoy 
more idle along the river, there is Jess revenue generated and the individual is at point B 
and utility level U,. 
Considering that the supplier faces an imposed increase in H (from H0 to H1), the 
compensating surplus (CS) is defmed as being the amount of income that must be given 
to the individual after the change in quantity for her to still be on her original 
indifference cuJVe U0. 
In the case of this imposed increase in quantity of idle land, the CS represents the 
individual's WT A to stay on the original level of welfare U"' in spite of change in 
quantity. Equivalent surplus (ES) is the maximum amount one is willing to pay (WTP) 
c 
H 
Fig. 2.1. Utility maximization for individuals owning riparian land. 
IS 
to keep getting Ho (or to keep producing L - H,) on the lower indifference curve U 1• 
Let us define w = w. H (p, Hh, U*) the inverse compensated supply fu nction for 
H"; w. H(.) is the rent that would induce the individual to supply H" amo unt of idle 
land in order to attain a utility level of U* , given that she could buy private goods (C) at 
p (numerai re). 
Let w0 = w. (p,H"0,U*0) , and w 1=w. (p,H".,U*,) denote the rent that would have 
supported H"0 and H"., respectively. 
CS = E(p,w,H0,U0) - E(p,w,H , ,U0) = HhOJ""''w*(p,Hh,U*0) dH" 
ES = E(p,w,H0,U 1) - E(p,w,H1 ,U 1) = Hnof""'w*(p, H",U* ,) dH" 
(25) 
(26) 
By asking individuals their WTP/WT A to participate in the program, we are 
trying to estimate the change in the util ity level implied by accepting to defer personal 
use or productive use of the land to a preservation program of the riverbanks. As 
shown in Fig. 2.2, the two estimates may have different values. 
The disparity between WT A and WTP measures has been extensively 
documented and several explanations have been suggested. It is sometimes attri buted 
to certain psychological factors. For example, Boyce et al. (! 992) explain it using the 
concept of intrinsic values . Individuals may want to preserve an environmental 
amenity for moral (or other) reasons. These values would appear more easily in WTA 
estimates than in WTP measures. 
Kahneman et al . (1990) based their argument on an endowment or the "loss 
aversion" effect. The endowment effect states that an individual attributes a subjective 
c 
ES 
cs 
Fig. 2.2. Difference between compensating surplus (CS) and equivalent 
surplus (ES) for a quantity restriction. 
value to gains and losses--winning 50 USD does not have the same value as losing 50 
USD. This effect exists when "an individual becomes attached to the good because he 
or she is often rewarded for doing so in many contexts" (Shogren et al. , 1994). This 
attachment leads the respondent to overestimate the minimum WT A compared to the 
WTP. Shogren et al. (1994) tested and rejected the hypothesis of an existing 
endowment effect. Rather, their results seem to support the economic explanation of 
16 
difference between WTA and WTP, provided by Hanemann (1991), who explained the 
divergence between the two measures in terms of substitution and income effects. The 
greater the income effect, and/or the smaller the substitution effect, the greater the 
disparity between WTP and WT A measures. As substitutability decreases, the trade-off 
between two goods x and y becomes less desirable, implying a greater disparity 
between the two estimates (see Shogren et al., 1994). 
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The Contingent Valuation Format 
The overall cost to owners of participating in the preservation program includes 
both out-of-pocket and psychological costs. The results of the VanKooten and 
Schmitz (1992) project indicate that "current economic incentives offered to 
agricultural producers are inadequate because they ignore non-market costs." A positive 
attitude toward habitat preservation cannot be used as a substitute for monetary 
incentives. ln order to capture both the market and the non-market costs of the 
proposed preservation program, it was necessary to use a non-market technique to 
evaluate the costs ofleaving the land idle. The CVM was chosen for its flexibility and 
its abi lity to measure total value. 
The nature of the privately held property rights by landowners has an important 
implication as to how the swvey should be composed. A pre-swvey was used to 
determine how land-use rights were distributed. It was found that land-use rights were 
strongly perceived by landowners. This provided the primary motivation for utilizing 
the WT A format. In effect, it would have been politically very difficult to ask owners 
their WTP for an imposed foregone use on land they considered their own. 
We will cite here, for illustration purposes, some examples to shed light on the 
sociopolitical situation in France when it comes to subsidizing farmers . In 1998, 
approximately I ,500 farmers demanded greater government subsidies by blocking the 
runway of a local airport in western France, by vandalizing train equipment, causing 
delays throughout the region, and by keeping up barricades on a major highway. The 
four-day blockade ended after France's agriculture minister promised to soften the blow 
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of cauliflower falling prices. In early 1999, large numbers of French farmers converged 
on the European parliament building in Strasbourg, to protest against proposed cuts in 
European Union farm subsidies. The proposed cuts were a consequence of the French 
government's commitment to keep down the budget deficit to qualify for the new single 
European currency. Finally, no later than at the beginning of December 1999, chicken 
farmers protested in Paris streets to ask for greater financial aid. In recent years, the 
differentiation of compensation based on animal density per forage area or permanent 
grassland area, for example, has been added to direct payment distribution in favor of 
extensive farming. This measure aimed to prevent oversupply by means of a 
disincentive for intensive production and to give an incentive for the maintenance of 
less productive land, which will contribute to the preservation of landscape and 
biodiversity. Our approach in this study follows the current tendency in France. 
Using the WT A format, respondents were first asked if they were interested or not 
in participating in a program. This allowed us to screen out high WT A estimates. In 
effect, we can think of respondents not being interested in participating in the program 
as having high WTA bids. In other words, the compensation needed for them to accept 
to participate would be high. If the respondents' answer was positive to the 
participation question, they were then asked their minimum WT A. 
The elicitation method used was the open format model. The open format method 
was chosen for several reasons . First, since respondents were geographically situated 
close to each other, often including strong family ties, we wanted to avoid suggesting 
values that they would have been able to compare with one another. The second reason 
is more pragmatic. Suggesting values would have been difficult. If the suggested 
values were perceived as being "too low," owners would be upset and suspect the 
political organizations themselves of mischief (i.e., Chamber of Agriculture, Ministry 
of Environment, etc.). On the other hand, suggesting large values would have meant 
that the study and programs proposed were not credible, or it might have encouraged 
them to give high WT A estimates. 
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It is useful at this point to step back a little and reflect on how the binary question 
preceding the open format one relates to the economic modeling of an individual 
maximizing utility. 
We have seen that by asking individuals their WTA estimate to participate to the 
preservation program, we were effectively trying to estimate the supplier surplus (i.e., the 
area above the supply curve). In practice, however, this question is preceded by a binary 
question asking respondents whether or not they would be willing to participate in the 
program. The problem formulates as follows. The maximum utility that an individual 
can obtain by choosing alternative i (in the set of al ternatives J) depends on the price of 
the good and the person's income (as well as some characteristics of the person). This 
maximum-attainable utility, given alternative i, can be written (Train, 1993) 
Y, = Y, (p, y, Z;, s, w;) (27) 
where z1 represents the observed characteristics of each alternative i in J, x is the 
quantity of the good, y is the person's income, s represents the observed characteristics 
of the person, p, is the price of the good, and w1 represents all unobserved factors 
I 
,, 
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This function is called the indirect utility function , that is, it is the maximum 
utility an individual can attain given that she has chosen alternative i. She will choose 
alternative I if and only if 
for allj in J, j "i (28) 
Considering the random utility approach, the individual is assumed to always 
choose the alternative with the highest utility. However, the utilities associated with 
each alternative are not known to the analyst with certainty. The indirect utility is 
therefore decomposed into observed and unobserved parts, 
(29) 
where e, is a function of unobserved variables, and V; is simply the difference between 
Y, and e,. 
With this approach, utilities are treated as random due to observational 
deficiencies resulting from different factors such as: unobserved attributes, unobserved 
tastes variations, measurement errors, and use of proxy variables (Ben-Akiva and 
Lerman, 1997). The researcher looks at the probability that for any individual, the 
utility of an alternative will exceed the utilities of all other feasible alternatives. 
Therefore, the probabil ity of alternative i being chosen is 
P; = prob(Y; (p;, y, Z;, s, w;)> Yi (p,. y, z,, s, wi), for all j in J, j " i] 
P, = prob(V; (p;, y, Z;, s) + e;> Vi (p,, y, z,, s) + e,, for all j in J, j " i] 
(30) 
(31) 
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P, = prob[e1 - e, < V, (p,, y, z, s)- V1 (p, y, ~· s)]. (32) 
(In effect, as utilities are ordinal only, only the difference matters.) 
The Econometric Modeling 
Dealing with the first question (discrete choice), we have to decide on the 
functional forms ofV and e. As is often the case, we will assume that Vis linear in 
parameters, while the disturbances will be assumed to follow a Pro bit model. The 
reasons for this choice will be explained later when we look at the Heckman ( 1979) 
model. 
The disturbances are viewed as the sum of a large number of unobserved but 
independent components. As the sample size increases, the disturbances tend to be 
normal . Assuming that e, and e1 are both normal with mean zero and variances a., and 
a., respectively, the term e1 - e, is also normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance a.,+a~-a,i =a' (which can, for simplici ty, be assumed to be equal to 1). We 
can use this result to solve for the choice probabilities as follows (Kmenta, 1986) 
Pi = prob [ei - e, < v,- V) 
7' ~exp[ -71 ( :-.)']de,cr > 0 c:•-c .J21to _ a 
1 (V, -V,)IG - l ] ( v -v) 
= ~ J ex -J.l ' du=¢ -'--' v2ncr ,._ _ 2 o (33) 
As shown above, respondents were given the opportunity to select for themselves 
whether they participated in the survey or not. Moreover, only respondents the most 
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interested in the preservation program gave their WT A bids. In other words, those not 
interested in tbe program screened themselves out by refusing to participate--we will 
examine later the reasons for such refusal. In other words, we are dealing with the 
problem of limited dependent variable (Kmenta, 1986). We only observe the WTA 
measure over a positive range. In other words, our sample is censored. 
This phenomenon is often described in tbe economic literature as the self-
selection bias, or sample selection bias. The non-responses to the survey or the WT A 
question hold different expected values for the amenity than comparable individuals 
who do respond. The potential for sample selection bias in mail surveys is particularly 
high compared to in-person surveys and phone surveys. This problem stems from the 
self-administered character of mail surveys and the concomitant lack of control the 
researchers have over the process of getting the respondent's cooperation in eliciting 
answers (Mi tchell and Carson, 1989). 
It is useful at this point to define sample selection bias more precisely in 
mathematical terms. To do this, we use Heckman's (1979) steps. 
To match the survey design for estimating the respondents' WTA, the simplest 
idea wou ld be to fit the following Eqs. for each individual: 
(34) 
(35) 
where X J; is a I x K; vector of exogenous regressors, such as income, size of the 
property, number oflots owned by the river etc.; pi is a Ki xI vector of parameters; and 
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Y, and Y 2, respectively, represent the acceptance to participate to the program, and the 
WT A estimate. 
E(u;,) = 0 
E(uj;, ui';.) = a ii ' , i=i' 
= 0 , i ~ i' 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
The final assumption is a consequence of a random sampling scheme. The 
regressor matrix is of full rank so that if al l data were available, the parameters of each 
Eq. could be estimated by least squares. 
The population regression function for Eq. (34) could be written as 
(i = I, ... I) (39) 
However, since we do not observe all Y 2 of our sample, the regression function 
for the subsample of available data is 
E(Y2;1 X2, sample selection rule) = X2; P2+ E(u2; I sample selection rule) (40) 
If the conditional expectation ofu2; is 0, then there is no bias, the regression function 
for the selected sample is the same as the population regression function , and least 
square estimation can be used to estimate the parameters P2• The only cost of having an 
incomplete sample would then be a loss in efficiency. 
If, however, E (U;) # 0, as in the case of sample selection bias, then we face more 
serious problems. In our case, data are available only on Y2; ifY,;>O, while ifY,; = 0, 
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there are no observations on Y2,. In other words, we face the problem of censored data 
on Y2,. 
E(Y2;I X2;, sample selection ru le) (41) 
(42) 
lfu 1; and u" are not independent, then 
(43) 
The selected sample regression function depends on X1; and X2;. The final tenn ofEq. 
(43) is omitted in the estimation ofEq. (35) . The bias resulting from non-randomly 
selected samples (here self-selection) to estimate behav ioral relationships is similar to 
the problem of omitted variables. 
The Heckman's approach takes care of this problem. Its procedure makes use of 
the infonnation contained in the yes/no responses (Y1;) and corrects for the sample bias 
that would otherwise be caused by using only the subset of quantitative responses in the 
regress ion estimation (Howe et al. , 1994). 
We assume that p(u li ,u2;) is a bivariate nonnal density. Its density function can be 
written as 
where~.= E(U;;), Var(U;;) = Fi; fo r j=i, and the correlation between uli and u2; is p 
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The joint normal distribution can be standardized (0, I) by sening o1= o2 =I, and 
[ 
I ] ( - I ' 2 , p(U ,, U,,)= , ,, exp -2(1 ') {U"+U2,- 2pU,u,;} 21t(l- p-) -p ) 
(45) 
It is assumed to be fully characterized by 
E(u/ ) = O;; for j=i 
The joint cumulative distribution of random variables Y" andY 2; having the above joint 
bivariate densi ty is 
Cll(h,k;p)= 4
1 
,xi'L. exp[--( 
1 
' ) ][ :, -2U,u,,+u;, ]dU,,du, C46) 
'' I - p- - 2 1-p 
where u" = hand u2; = k . We consider that the distribution is truncated from below 
(i .e., only the values ofu" that exceed his used). The resulting joint distribution has 
density function (Johnson and Kotz, 1972) 
P ~".u'' ( u", u,,) = [ 1_ ~(h)] exp[ - 2( 1 ~ p' ) (u;, 2u, u,. + u;.)] 
( "> h) (47) 
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If the error terms have a bivariate normal distribution, then the conditional mean ofu2, 
with respect ofu li can be written as (Greene, 1990, theorem 22.4) 
E(u2;1 >-XnP 1)= po,A., 
E(u, ;l un >- X nP1) = (o 12 o,lo 1o 2)A.i 
E(u1,lu ~o >-X ~oP 1 ) = [o12/o 1] A.i 
E(ulilu li >-X,,p ,) = [o,,lo ,] A.i 
where, A., = <j>(Z;)/1 - <I>( Z,) 
(48) 
(49) 
(50) 
(51) 
(52) 
where, <I> and <I> are, respectively, the density and distribution function for a standard 
normal variable, and 
(53) 
"A.," is the inverse of Mill's ratio, also called the hazard rate; the greater "A.," the greater 
the selectivity bias. 
The full statistical model for normal population disturbances can now be 
developed. The conditional regression function for selected samples may be written as 
E(Y liiX li,Y ,;> O)=XnP , + [o,,lo,]A., 
E(Y2 ,IX2»Y ~o>O) = X,;p, + [o1,1o.JA., 
Adding disturbances to our Equations (24) and (25), we reach the model 
(54) 
(55) 
(56) 
where 
E(vu) = E(v") = 0 
E(v,.IX1., A1, u,. > - X,,p ,) = 0 
E(v2,IX2., A., u,. >-X"p ,) = 0 
E(v,v,.IX,. X2,. A.i. u">-X.,p ,) = 0 
fori * i'. 
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(57) 
(58) 
(59) 
(60) 
In summary, we took the "omitted" variable A., out of the error tem1 u21 and put it 
back in the Eq., [o 12/o ,] being the coefficient of A,= <jl(Z,)/1- <l> (Z,). If[o1/ o 1] is 
significant, then we can conclude that there was no selection bias (we test for the 
hypothesis flo: [ o ,;o ,] = 0). We do, however, still have the problem of 
heteroscedasticity, as shown by Eq. (6lc). 
Since we are dealing with a truncated bivariate normal distribution, the variance 
can be wrin en as (Greene, 1990, Theorem 22.4) 
E(vz;2IXz,. A;. u" >-X"p,) = o22 [1 -p2{A; (A., - Z)}] 
E(vz,2IX2,. A,, u, , >-X"p ,) = odl - p2(A,Z- A./ )] 
E(v2,2IX2,, A,, U~; >-X,,p ,) = o22 [1 - p2) + p2(l+A,Z- A,Z)] 
where 
(6la) 
(6lb) 
(61c) 
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(62) 
and 
o::: 1 + z;t .. , - A.;'::: 1. (63) 
The least squares estimators ofP2, and o 12 I o 1 are unbiased but inefficient. This is due 
to the heteroscedasticity apparent from the above Eq. Further, we have (Heckman, 
1979) 
(64) 
In our censored sample, we do not know Y2, ifY,, = 0, but we know Xn for the 
observations Y" = 0. Therefore, we first estimate the parameters of the probability that 
Y " = 1 (i.e., Pt/o 1) using a Probit analysis. This is the first step of Heckman's two-step 
procedure. It enables one to obtain consistent estimates of knowing P / o 1 (= b*). We 
can then estimate z,. and hence A.,. The second step involves going back to our 
regression function (56) and replacing A., by our new estimated (A.,) and applying the 
ordinary least squares method using then observations for which n= 1. 
In summary, the first step is to estimate a Probit model where the dependent 
variable is 1 or 0, depending on whether y" is observed or not. This is done on the whole 
sample. This provides a consistent estimator of Z, and A., . The consistent estimator of A., 
is then inserted in Eq. (56) and the second step of the two-step procedure is the 
application ofleast squares to the resulting Eq. The estimator ofp , produced by this 
II 
II 
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process is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. The weighted least squares 
method can be successfully used to address the remaining heteroskedasticity problem. 
Survey Design 
The questionnaire (see Appendix B) was first refined and critically examined by 
ecologists and lawyers from the Departmental Chamber of Agriculture, to see if the 
questionnaire was realistic. A pretest was then conducted in the winter of 1997 with 
five landowners with property adjacent to the river. 
A list of landowners was obtained from the Office of Land Titles, and they were 
all contacted by mail in the spring of 1997. The questionnaire was originally 
constructed for face-to-face interviews. However, due to organizational and financial 
constraints, a mail survey was used. 
To encourage their response, a lonery was organized. A lot of200 USD (I ,000 
francs) was to be won among those who answered the questionnaire, even partially. One 
month following the mail survey, respondents were contacted by phone and were asked if 
they wanted help in clarifying any questions or problems they could have in answering 
the questionnaire. A meeting was organized if they desired. Three people requested a 
meeting. 
Three programs of habitat preservation were suggested to respondents, each 
involving different degrees of involvement. The duration of the program was I 0 years, 
and subsequently renewable. These programs are described below. 
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I. No upkeep: You provide the land. The strip ofland allocated to the program 
is not to be maintained. Its width is between I 0 and 50 meters. This protected zone 
would allow for preservation and reproduction of different species. 
2. Upkeep of a trail: You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide trail. 
This trail may be used by hunters, fishermen, or hikers. The upkeep of the trail is your 
responsibility. The width of this strip ofland is between I 0 and 50 meters. 
3. Upkeep+ wood: You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide trail at 
your charge. You plant the trees and bushes, which are supplied to you, and you are 
responsible for the upkeep ofthe land twice a year. The upkeep consists of clearing 
brushwood, getting rid of dead wood and garbage. The heavy upkeep work (e.g., 
cutting trees) is also your responsibility, but the wood belongs to you. 
Respondents first stated if they were interested in any of the programs, and then 
gave their WTA as well as the width of strip of land they would be willing to provide 
(see Fig. 2.3). 
II. To which one of these program(s) would you accept to participate? 
program I program 2 program 3 
12. (You accept to participate in several programs) Which program do you prefer? 
program 1 program 2 program 3 
13. You accept to parricipa<e in a program) What would be the strip of land width you would accept 
to allocate to this program? meters 
14. \Vhat is the minimum compensation that you would have to receive to participate in this program? 
_____ francs 
Fig. 2.3. Form respondents were asked to complete. 
Discussion of the Sample 
Socioeconomic Status of the Surveyed 
Population 
The results indicated in this part are explained in more details in Broadhead 
(1997). The total population surveyed was 315 households. The response rate was 
30% completed survey. This response rate is comparable to other mail surveys. The 
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sample size is also comparable to other CV surveys. VanKooten and Schmitz (1992), 
for example, conducted 66 interviews. Mitchell and Carson (1989) made a review of 
different CV surveys and the size of the samples surveyed (see Appendix C). 
As shown by Harrison and Les ley (1996), a small sample can be as effective as a 
larger one in that it leads essentially to the same conclusions (and is less costly). The 
authors obtained the same damage estimates using a model of the behavior of students 
to predict the behavior of all of the adult citizens of the United States, in the case of the 
Exxon Valdez 1989 oil spill. 
Our sample is consisted of 40% farmers and 60% non-farmers. Among non-
farmers, a major portion of them is represented by retirees (56). The average age for 
our sample is 57 years (with a maximum of92 years and a minimum of26 years). This 
tendency is common in the rural community both at the regional and the national level 
(see Table 2.1). This average is slightly higher for non-farmers. 
Almost all respondents were male, and 87% of them were married. On average, 
they had 2.1 children. This result is slightly greater than the average for France. It is 
worth noting that farmers often lived with a member of their family other than children. 
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Table 2. 1 
Age distribution 
Variable < 35 years 35-59 years > 59 years 
Sample 12.5% 60.5% 27.0% 
Region 18.0% 52.0% 30.0% 
Source: Tableaux Economiques Midi-Pyrenees, INSEE (1996). 
This is particularly true as they often became farmers after their parents and the 
business is of family type, as we will see in a subsequent chapter. 
One question in the survey asked respondents for the household monthly net 
income. It is interesting here to note that beside the expected reservations this question 
triggered, farmers had often a genuine difficulty in indicating what their revenue 
amounted to. This is most likely due to complicated tax and subsidy measures. Fifty-
fi ve percent of the individuals surveyed indicated earning less than 2,000 USD per 
month/year and per household, and 29% indicated a revenue comprised between 2,000 
USD and 3,600 USD. 
Characteristics of the Property 
Let us first consider the characteristics of the farms. Results show that 68% of 
them are of family type. In other words, the farm is legally run by one or more family 
members, in opposition with a business-like legal status. Moreover, farmers tend to be 
farmers from one generation to another. Only 4% of farmers indicated that they 
represented the first generation of farmers in their family. 
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The average size of the farms is 57 hectares. More precisely, 81% of farmers own 
more than 20ha. This result are on the higher side of results observed at the regional 
level, where 55% of farmers are found to own more than 20ha (see Table 2.2). 
For non-farmers, the average size of the property is llha. The majority of them 
(8 1% as well) owns less than I Oha. 
For the purpose of our study, and to better understand the current situation on the 
banks of the Garonne River, respondents were asked different questions on the current 
situation of the lots that they owned lining the river. Those questions were related to 
the current activity on the lots, their geographical situation, and their size. 
On average, farmers own between 3 and 4 lots by the river, while non-farmers 
own 2. The average area for those lots is close to 4ha (farmers = 5, non-farmers= 3). 
More precisely, a large majority of farmers own between I and Sha of land by the river 
(50% for non-farmers) . However, since there is a large number of non-farmers owning 
some land by the river, the total amount of land owned by this group is less than the 
total amount of land owned by farmers on the riverbanks. This may be ofhigh interest 
policy wise. 
Table 2.2 
Property size, in hectares (ha) 
Variable < 5ha 5-!0ha ll-20ha 21 -50ha > 50ha Total 
Fanners 3.0% 3.0% 12.0% 37.0% 44.0% 100.0% 
Non-fanners 61.0% 20.0% 5.0% 7.0% 7.0% 100.0% 
Region 18.0% 10.4% 16.7% 35.2% 19.6% 100.0% 
We obtained the same tendency when dealing with the lots linear (i.e., the 
measure of the length, in meters, of the lot running along the river). Individually, 
farmers own more land by the river, but they are under represented compared to non-
farmers when considering the overall size of the land owned on the river's banks. 
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The linear of the lot owned by farmers is generally larger per household (75% of 
farmers own more than 100 meters, while only 34% of non-farmers fit in this category), 
but the total linear is larger for non-farmers than for farmers. Interestingly enough, 
many owners were not able to indicate the size (or the exact location) of their lots. This 
can be explained by the very dynamic nature of the riverbed. It must be added here that 
frequently flooded areas become state property. Therefore, the ownership of the 
landscape is subject to frequent and unexpected changes. 
For farmers, irrigated crops such as com, soybeans, and sorghum, along with 
poplar plantations, remain the main activities (51%). Often, several activities are 
conducted on the same lot (e.g., com in the field and poplar on the edge of the river). 
For non-farmers, poplar farming represents an important activity (39%). One reason 
explaining the success of the poplar plantation (not specific to this area) is the design of 
the tax system in France. In effect, such plantations are subject to a 30-year levy on 
property taxes. 
Thirty-four percent of non-farmers also indicated renting the lots out for 
agricultural use. Finally, 30% own a house on those lots. This last information leads 
us to expect that the preservation programs may incite stronger reservations among 
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non-fanners (about public access to their backyard, or depending on the exact location 
of their house on the lot). 
As mentioned previously, a large proportion of owners indicated not using their 
lots up to the river's edge (78%). The main reason given to explain such a situation is 
geographical (e.g., steep banks, existing trails, etc.). But also, some respondents 
indicated doing this to either protect the banks, or because their lot was too small to 
manage effectively. 
Among people who declared not producing on those lots, almost half of them also 
indicated that they were not maintaining the lots. The average width of strips not 
maintained is 18 meters, with a minimum of3 meters, and a maximum of80 meters. 
Results 
Empirical Results 
Thirty-eight people answered positively to the CV question and gave their 
minimum WT A bid for at least one program. The average WT A we obtained for 
Program I is 275 USD/hectare (1373.5 francs/ha). Farmers indicated a greater 
minimum compensation. The average WTA for farmers was indeed 546 USD/hectare 
(2731 francs/ha), while it was only 38 USD/hectare (192.5 francs/ha) for non-fanners. 
The first program received the most favorable responses. Consistently with what 
we expected, Programs 2 and 3 revealed larger WT A because they require more 
involvement from respondents. This result reflects the boundaries of the market rental 
rates for this area (e.g., between 26 USD and 500 USD (130 and 2,500 francs) , 
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depending on the potential productivity of the lot). The values are also consistent with 
payments being made for existing conservation ( e.g.,from 20 USD to 340 USD for the 
Midi-Pyrenees region). 
For simplicity, we will now focus on the results obtained for Program 1. It is 
important to mention here that 19 persons (over 33 total who agree to participate in 
program I) agreed to participate in the program for zero compensation. This can be 
seen in Fig. 2.4, which shows the distribution of the WTA bids. 
It is also worth noting that 70 respondents indicated that they were not using the 
banks of the river, among which 33 also indicated not keeping up that land. Comparing 
now the minimum compensation demanded by those among them who also accepted to 
participate in a preservation program (14 people), we observe a significantly lower 
result. They demanded smaller compensations. One reason that may explain why they 
do ask for compensation, however, comes from the fact that they are willing to widen 
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Fig. 2.4. Distribution of willingness to accept bids. 
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the existing strip of land not being used. The amount of compensation demanded 
would therefore account for this additional part they would be willing to allocate to the 
preservation program. 
Econometric Estimation 
The LIMDEP software program was used to run the estimations (Greene, 1991). 
The Probit model for distinguishing between those who did and those who did not 
accept to participate in the preservation program (ACC) was initially estimated. The 
regression results are presented in Table 2.3. They indicate that being a farmer (FAR), 
not using the parcels up to the river's edge (lJSE), and the total size of the lot(s) 
adjacent to the river (SUP) are the major factors determining whether a landowner 
accepts to participate in the preservation program. We obtained significant !-statistics 
for each of these variables (at 5 and 10%). 
Table 2.3 
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation 
Variable Estimated coefficient t-statistic 
Pro bit 
.22 2.2 
FAR 
USE .19 2.6 
SUP .02 1.8 
Two-stage least square 2868 2.0 
IN! 
IN2 2962 2.1 
PAR 288.4 2.3 
Lambda -2406.0 -1.8 
1: 
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ACC = 0.22 FAR- 0.19 USE + 0.02 SUP. 
Both the USE and the FAR variables were dichotomous variables, which took the 
value of one if the lots were not being used up to the river's edge, and if respondents 
were farmers, respectively. 
The obtained variables, such as income, education level, number of dependents, 
and type of activity on the lots could not explain landowners' acceptance to participate. 
The likelihood ratio index forthe Probit estimation was [1-(55.9/58.3)] = 0.043. 
The second step, the least-squares estimation of the minimum compensation 
demanded by respondents, corrected for heteroskedasticity, was then estimated. The 
variab les income (IN! , IN2), and the number of parcels they own by the river (PAR) 
are significant in determining the amount ofWTA demanded. Results are indicated in 
Table 2.3. 
WTA = 2868 INl 296211\2 ... 288.4 SUP 
The variable !Nl included respondents with a net monthly income per household of less 
than 2,000 USD (1 0,000 francs), while the variab le IN2 included respondents with a net 
monthly income per household comprised between 2,000 USD and 3,600 USD (10,000 
to 18,000 francs) . They are positively related to the amount of compensation 
demanded. The PAR variable is also positively correlated with the amount of 
compensation demanded. The R2 obtained for the second step of the estimation was 
.27. 
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The coefficient of lambda estimated in the Heckman procedure was significant at 
95%. As explained in the next section, this indicates that there is no selection bias. 
Reasons for Refusal to Participate 
Thus far, we have concentrated our discussion on respondents who indicated that 
they would accept offers to participate in a program. However, given the important 
number of households who refused to participate in a program (55 households), it is at 
least equally important to understand the reasons for their refusal to participate (only 
two respondents refused to answer whether they were interested or not in a preservation 
program). 
Based on survey comments, we distinguished four main reasons for refusal to 
participate. 
I. Geographical: people refused to participate because their lot was too small, 
there existed some buildings, or else the banks were too steep. 
2. Personal: people indicated that they were too old, too busy, or else that they 
wanted to sell their land. 
3. Protest: people indicated that they opposed the programs themselves (i.e., 
would refuse hikers' access, etc.), the idea of being compensated, or because they do 
not trust the government. 
4. Other: for example, the respondents did not know exactly the location of their 
lots. 
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As can be seen from Table 2.4, the main reason for refusal invoked by 
respondents is geographical (39.5%). One possible interpretation here is that 
respondents did not feel "concerned" by the program, either because the compensation 
would need to be umealistically high, for example, where buildings exist on the lot, or 
else because the lot is so small that compensation would be insignificant. Given the 
fact that farmers, on average, own larger lots by the river, it is consistent that they had a 
low percentage of responses in this category (17%). 
For farmers, the main reason for refusal was "protest" (34.5%). It may be 
important to add that farmers represent a group that often suffers under environmental 
programs to conserve water or control pollutants. As a result, they typically oppose 
such programs. Moreover, they are often presented a wide variety of programs 
(environmental or not). Similarly, recall that non-farmers are mainly represented by 
retirees, 41% of whom are older than 65. This would explain why the "personal" 
reason comes second for this latter category. They may, for example, feel too old to 
participate in a I 0-year preservation program; thus, they may be unwilling to tie their 
heirs to their decision. 
Table 2.4 
Reasons for refusal to participate in a preservation program, in percentage 
Landowner Protest Personal Geographical Other 
Farmer 34.5 (8) 22.0 (5) 17.5 (4) 26.0 (6) 
Non-farmer 17.5 (7) 27.5 (II) 52.5 (21) 2.5 (I) 
Total 24.0 (15) 25.5 (16) 39.5 (25) 11.0 (7) 
Number of persons responding in parentheses. 
Total 
100 (23) 
100 (40) 
100 (63) 
It is also interesting to note that among respondents who indicated that they did 
not maintain or use the banks, 19 still refused to participate in the program. In other 
words, they refused to be compensated for a program they essentially are already in 
compliance with. 
Discussion 
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Parallel to this study, Desaigues and Gauthier (1997) conducted a survey 
evaluating the benefits associated with the protection of tbe riverbanks. They used the 
CVM to ask the general public in the region how much they would be willing to pay to 
have a program of protection implemented. The proposed program was similar to 
Program I of this study. It was also added that access to the riverbanks would then 
most probably be restricted, if not forbidden to the general public. In other words, a 
large portion of the value attributed to the program would be non-use value. The 
average WTP they obtained is 30 USD (150 rrancs) per year, and for 5 years. The total 
budget it represents is approximately 3 million USD (15 million francs) per year. On 
the cost side, we estimated that the total cost of implementing such a program would 
amount to 280,000 USD (1.4 millions francs) per year. In other words, costs were 
smaller than benefits. 
Conclusions 
Tbis srudy was undertaken with the primary purpose of assessing the welfare loss 
to landowners resulting rrom the implementation of a preservation program along the 
42 
Garonne Ri ver. Several conclusions can be drawn. The analysis indicates that the 
WT A format can be effectively used to estimate welfare loss. Moreover, the binary/ 
continuous model appears not to lead to exaggerated estimates, since WTA figures 
elicited existing market values. This result is also confirmed by the rather large number 
of zero bids obtained. However, it is important to add that the use of the WTA measure 
has been possible for two main reasons: respondents had a thorough knowledge of the 
good itself and its value to them--this is panicularly true for fanners--and the proposed 
preservation program was realistic. Respondents believed in the applicability of the 
program, which then does not represent a vague and improbable possibility. 
One interesting question is to ask if, in the case where respondents do not know 
the good very well, the divergence between WI A and WTP should be attributed not as 
much to substitution and income effects, but rather to some "strategic" behavior. ln 
other words, would respondents minimize their bid in a WTP format if they were 
uncertain of its utility, while exaggerating their WTA value not having anything to 
lose? It seems therefore very important in any welfare loss estimation to be able to link 
the good, or the event, to already known factors or situations. This topic will be studied 
more in depth in our next paper, where we analyze the effect of a "contingent first-price 
sealed-bid auction" on the WI A estimates. 
Finally, this study sheds some light on the reasons why some respondents refused 
to participate in the preservation program. We were able to differentiate those who 
were indifferent to the program from those who opposed ii. This information provides 
some important policy insights. For instance, many respondents admitted being 
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interested in the program, but suggested some variations, or else preferred some other 
means of compensation (for example, technical advice on how to maintain riparian 
land). Similarly, protest responses may, in some cases, be of valuable interest in future 
studies as they indicate that respondents' refusal to participate is not as much linked to 
the good itselfbut to the "administration" part of it. This is particularly true for 
respondents who emitted strong reservations toward the governmental agency or the 
feasibility of the program itself. It would of valuable interest in any WTP study to be 
able to differentiate these answers from other zero WTP bids. 
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CHAPTER3 
.AJ'PLICA TIO OF HYPOTHETICAL AUCTI01 SETTING 
TO WILLINGNESS-TO-ACCEPT MEASURE IN A 
CONTINGENT VALUATION STUDY' 
Abstract 
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This paper is devoted to examining funher the potential for undertaking valuation 
exercises using the WT A format , by comparing WT A estimates obtained in an open-
question format with a 'contingent first-price sealed bid auction' setting. Results 
indicate that WTA values obtained in the two different settings were not stati stically 
different. We conclude that WTA estimates in the open question format were not 
exaggerated. More generally, this paper shows that the use of auctions can be 
successfully applied to the provision of public goods in the case of compensation 
demanded. 
Introduction 
When using the contingent valuation method, researchers generally agree that the 
use of the willingness-to-accept format often leads to one important bias: the lack of 
upper bound in the minimum compensation demanded. Respondents tend to inflate 
their minimum compensation demanded (Cummings et al., 1986). This conclusion has 
'Coauthored by Catherine Broadhead and Basudeb Biswas. 
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traditionally been reached by comparing willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-
accept (WTA) measures. Several explanations have been suggested to explain this 
difference, such as a psychological (Kahneman et al., 1990) and economic one 
(Hanemann, 1991). As pointed out by Hanemann, there is no evidence that both 
measures should, in theory, be equivalent. 
This paper is devoted to examining further the potential for undertaking valuation 
exercises using the WTA format, by comparing WTA estimates obtained in an open-
ended question format with a "contingent first-price sealed bid auction" setting. A game 
theory approach is used to analyze respondents' strategies, and the Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium is defined. 
We first explain the different types of auctions and the types of response they lead 
to. We then analyze the first-price sealed bid auction as a direct application of game 
theory. Finally, we apply the analysis to our survey (Chapter 2). 
Results indicate that respondents' mean WT A measures are not statistically 
different. This result is confirmed when a Heckman model regression (Broadhead, 
1997), including whether or not respondents were placed in an auction setting, is run. 
The auction setting did not lead respondents to indicate lower compensation values. 
This result is consistent with the List and Shogren (1998) findings. In other words, the 
estimates obtained with the simple open-ended question format reflected individuals' 
true values. 
48 
Auctions 
The practice of auctioning takes us back to a very long time. Cassady (1967) 
tracks it to 500 BC, in Babylon, for the sale of women to be married. The study of 
auctions, however, is more recent. The origin of the subject is the seminal work by 
Vickrey (1961) and later the important contributions by Griesmer et al. (1967), who 
initiated formulations in terms of games with incomplete information, later specified as 
Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967; Myerson, 1985; Gibbons, 1992). 
In many markets, transaction prices are determined in auctions. It is the case, for 
example, for the sale of timber, antique objects, farming products or animal stocks. In 
the most common form, prospective buyers compete by submitting bids to a seller. 
Each bid is an offer to buy, which states a quantity .and a maximum price. The seller 
then allocates the available supply among those offering the highest prices exceeding 
the seller's asking price (Wilson, 1992). Auctions can also exhibit one buyer and several 
sellers, in which case only sellers offering a minimum price will be selected. 
There exist a variety of auctions. We can classify them based on the relationship 
between different buyers' valuations of what is being auctioned. Rasmussen (1989) 
describes the difference between a private-value auction, a common-value auction, and 
a correlated-value one. Following the author, we will call the dollar value of the utility 
that player i receives from an object its value to her, vi, and we will call her estimate of 
its value her valuation Vi. 
In a private-value auction, each player knows the true value they attribute to the 
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auctioned object, even though they may not know the values of the other players. Very 
importantly, a player cannot extract any information about their own value from the 
valuations of the other players. One example, mentioned above, is the sale of timber. 
Knowing all the other bids would not change player i's value for the lot, although it 
may change their strategy. 
In contrast, a common-value auction is characterized by the fact that players have 
identical values. In this case, private information plays a considerable role as the other 
players' valuations affect player i's own value. The new issue of corporate bonds and 
stocks in the US, which are usually sold to investment bankers, belongs to that category 
of auctions. Each bidder is eager to know the others' valuations in order to form a more 
accurate idea of the true value of the good. 
However, the majority of auctions in everyday life is situated between the private-
value auction and the common-value one. That is, we are dealing with what is called 
the correlated-value auction, in which the valuations of the different bidders are 
correlated but their values may differ. For modeling purposes, however, private-value 
versus common-value auctions is an appropriate simplification. As we will soon see, 
the case studied in this paper deals with private-value auction. 
If it is true that all auctions have set rules, imply given strategies, and then define 
payoffs, they often vary greatly. It is therefore interesting to classify auctions based on 
the different rules they imply. Typically, the types of auctions often described are: (a) 
English (ascending, first-price open), (b) first-price sealed bid, (c) second-price sealed 
bid, and (d) Dutch (descending). 
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English 
The seller offers an item and they accept the highest bid offered above their 
asking price. Each bidder is free to revise their bid upward. A player's strategy is their 
seri es of bids as a function of their value, their prior estimate of other players' 
valuations, and the past bids of all other players. Their bid can, therefore, be updated as 
their information set changes. The winner's payoff is their value minus their highest bid. 
The English auction is the most common type of auction in the United States. Cassady 
(1967) estimated that 78% or more of all auctions in the world are conducted on the 
ascend ing-bid basis. 
First-Price Sealed Bid 
Each bidder subnlits one bid, in ignorance of the other bids. The highest bidder 
pays their bid and wins the object. A player's strategy is their bid as a function of their 
value and their prior beliefs about the other players' valuations. The winner's payoff is 
their value minus their bid. 
Second-Price Sealed Bid 
Each bidder submits one bid, in ignorance of the other bids. The bids are opened, 
and the highest bidder pays the amount of the second-highest bid and wins the object. A 
player's strategy is their bid as a function of their value and their prior beliefs about the 
other players' valuations. The winner's payoff is their value nlinus the second-highest 
bid that was made. 
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Dutch 
The seller announces a bid, which they continuously lower until some buyer stops 
them and takes the object at that price. One example is the Ontario tobacco auction, 
cited in Rasmussen ( 1989), which uses a clock four feet in diameter marked with 
quarter cent gradations. Each of six or so buyers has a stop button. The clock hand 
drops a quarter cent a time, and the stop buttons are registered so that ties cannot occur. 
The farmers who are selling their tobacco watch from an adjoining room and can later 
reject the bids if they feel they are too low (reserve price) . This type of auction is also 
used for the sale of fish in England (Cassady, 1967). A player's strategy is when to stop 
the bidding as a function of their valuation and their prior beliefs as to other players' 
valuations. The winner's payoff is their value minus their bid. 
Those different types of auctions tend to be associated with particular kinds of 
commodities. The sale of fish and the sale of real estate, for example, require different 
auctioning methods. Oral auctions, either English or Dutch, are favored for animal 
stock and perishable commodities, perhaps to ensure rapid consideration of many lots 
with variable quality attributes. Most auctions of art and antiques use the oral format 
also . On the other hand, in the United States, new issues of corporate bonds and stocks 
are usually sold via sealed bids, as is the sale of timber in France (Elyakime eta!. , 
1994) as well as in the United States. Land and buildings are also often so ld via sealed 
bids. 
Each type of auction encourages a very specific type of response. In other words, 
these auctions lead to different strategies from bidders. For both the English and the 
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second-price sealed bid auctions, the player's dominant strategy is to keep bidding some 
small amount epsilon more than the previous high bid until they reach their valuation 
and then stop. This is optimal because they always want to buy the object if the price is 
less than its value to them, but they want to pay the lowest price possible. In the case of 
the second-price sealed bid auction, one's valuation is the dominant strategy since the 
players who bid less are more likely to lose the auction, but pay the same price if they 
do win. All bidding ends when the price reaches the valuation of the player with the 
second-highest valuation. The optimal strategy is independent of risk neutrality if 
players know their own values with certainty rather than estimating them, although 
risk-averse players who must estimate their values should be more conservative in 
bidding. 
The Dutch and the first-price sealed bid auctions are strategically equivalent. The 
trade-off is between bidding high--thus winning more often--and bidding low--thus 
benefitting more if the bid wins. The optimal strategy depends on the players' risk 
preference and their belief about the other players. The equilibrium is therefore less 
robust than the equilibrium of English and second-price sealed bid auctions. The reason 
for the equivalence between the two types of auctions is that in both cases, the only 
disclosed information is the last bid. In the first-price sealed bid auction, a player's bid 
is irrelevant unless it is the highest. Similarly, in the Dutch auction, a player's stopping 
price is not disclosed unless it is the highest. 
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Finally, an analysis of auctions can consider whether the process is static or 
dynamic. In dynamic versions, the bidders observe others' bids and they can revise their 
bids sequentially. 
For the purpose of this paper, we wi ll focus on the first-price sealed bid auction, 
in the frame of a private- (or independent-) value auction. Moreover it will be a static 
process. 
Auctions As a Direct Application of Game Theory 
Because auctions are stylized markets with well-defined rules, auctions are apt 
subjects for applications of game theory (Ph lips, 1988). Moreover, they represent some 
interesting cases of strategic behavior. They also are useful to elicit preferences so that 
maximal gains from trade can be realized . 
They are particularly valuable as illustrations of games of incomplete information 
because bidders' private information is the main factor affecting strategic behavior. The 
simpler forms of auctions induce normal-form games that are essentially "solved" by 
applying directly the basic equilibrium concepts of non-cooperative game theory, such 
as the Nash equilibrium (Wi lson, 1992). 
We will concentrate here on the first-price sealed bid auction and the game form it 
takes. The first-price sealed bid auction represents a game of incomplete information 
also called Bayesian game. 
In a game of incomplete information, the players' payoff functions are not 
common knowledge. There exists at least one player who is not sure about the other 
players' payoffs functions . For the auction of interest in this paper, each bidder knows 
her own valuation for the good being sold, but does not know the other bidders' 
valuation. Since bids are submitted in sealed-envelopes, we can think of the players' 
moves as being simultaneous. 
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Harsanyi (1967) made the assumption that, in dealing with games of incomplete 
information, every player assigns a subjective probability to all variables not depending 
on the player's own strategy choice. Consequently, the situation can be redefined as a 
game of complete information on the probability functions from which each bidder 
draws her valuation and on everybody's payoff or utility (Gibbons, 1992). 
We follow here Gibbons' representation of the normal form of a static Bayesian 
game. The normal-form representation of ann-player game of complete information is 
G = {S , ... S,; u, ... u,} 
where Si is player i's strategy space and U; (s, , . . . , s") is player i's payoff when the 
players choose the actions (s 1, ••• , s,). This can also be written as 
G = {A,, ... A,; u1, ••• u,} 
(Ia) 
(!b) 
where Ai is player i's action space and U; (a, ... , aJ is player i's payoff when the players 
choose the actions (a,, .. . , aJ. In effect in a simultaneous-move game of complete 
information a strategy for a player is simply an action. In the case of a game of 
incomplete information, we first need to represent the idea that if each player knows their 
own payoff function, they are uncertain about the other players' functions. Let player i's 
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possible payoff functions be represented by u, (a, ... , a,; tJ, where t represents the type of 
player i, and belongs to a type space T,. For example, if player i has two payoff functions, 
they are said to have two types, ~ 1 and ~2 . Their payoff functions would be noted 
(2) 
Writing that player i knows their payoff function is the same as saying that they know 
their type(s). Similarly, we can write that player i is uncertain about the other players 
types, denoted t .;· 
t_, = (tJ' .... , t ;. J> ~+J··· · · t,) (3) 
We denote the probability distribution representing the player i's belief about the other 
players' types, !_; , P; (t_; It,). 
It is important here to note that we are in a private-value type of auction. ln other 
words, players' types are independent . p; (t., /t,) does not depend on t,. Therefore, we can 
write player i's belief as p; (t.;). 
To define an equilibrium concept for this static Bayesian game, we first need to 
define the players' strategy spaces in the game. The central idea is that each player's 
strategy must be a best response to the other players' strategies. Therefore, a Nash 
equilibrium is simply a ash equilibrium in a Bayesian game. 
ln the static Bayesian game, G = {A I> ...... A,, T 1 •••• •• Tn; p1 • . • Pn; u1, . ...... Un}, the 
strategies s*= (s* 1 ••• s* J are a (pure strategy) Bayesian . rash equilibrium if for each 
player i and for each ofi's types in T;, s*, (~)solves 
max 2: U,{s,*(t1), . . ,s* , _ 1 ) , a, ,s*,~ 1 (t; . 1 ), .. ,s,*(t,);t]p,(t _,I t;) 
a,e A t,e r _, 
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(4) 
That is, no player wants to change his or her strategy, even if the change involves only 
one action by one type. 
Having explained a Bayesian game, we now turn to the representation of the first-
price sealed bid auction. We assume there are n bidders (i = ! , ... , n). Bidder i is said to 
have a valuation vi for the commodity sold. If i gets the good and pays the price p, then 
i's payoff is v,-p. 
It is necessary at this point to make some assumptions. Although each bidder does 
not know their rivals' bid functions , they can make informed guesses by supposing that 
the valuations of all bidders are drawn from the same probability distribution (Phlips, 
1988). Following Vickrey (196 1), this distribution is assumed to be rectangular, so that 
each value is equally likely. The bidders' valuations are uniforml y distributed on the 
same interval [0, I] by a suitable choice of scale and origin. Finally, the bidders' 
valuations are independent. In other words, a bidder's valuation conveys no information 
about the other bidders' valuations. To go back to our previous notation, this last 
assumption was written as p, (t_, /t1) = p1 (t.;). 
Bids are constrained to be non-negative. The bidders submit their bids 
simultaneously. The higher bidder wins the good and pays the price they bid; the other 
bidders pay and get nothing. In case of a tie, the winner is determined by the flip of a 
coin. We assume that all bidders have the same risk preferences, in order to concentrate 
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attention on the incomplete information aspect. In this case, and following Vickrey 
( 1961 ), we assume that bidders are risk neutral. This is reflected by the linear form 
taken by their utility fimction (or payoff) . Finally, all of the above information is 
common knowledge. 
The action is the submitting of a (non-negative) bid, b1• The valuation of player i 
(or her type) is denoted vi, following the previous example. 
(5) 
The action space, 
A;= [0, oo] (6) 
The type space, 
~ = [0, I] (7) 
Because valuations are independent, player i believes that vi is uniformly distributed on 
[0, 1], no matter what the value of v1• Player i's payoff function is: 
I vi-bi if b , > b J] u,(b ,, ... b,;v,, ... v,)= (vi- bi) / n ifb , = b , 0 ifb , < b , (8) 
To derive a Bayesian ash equilibrium of this auction, we begin by constructing 
the players' strategy space. In a Bayesian game, a strategy space is a function from the 
type and action spaces. Therefore, a strategy for player i is a fimction b,(v;) specifying 
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the bid that each ofi's types or valuations would choose. Player i's b,(v,) is a best 
response to the other players' strategies b1(v;) and vice versa. 
Formally, the pair of strategies (b(v1) , b(v,)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for 
each v1 in [0,1], b,(v;) solves 
(9) 
Each player tries to maximize the mathematical expectation of their own payoff in 
terms of their probability distribution pi . This assumption is called the Bayesian 
hypothesis. Each player i maximizes the expected payoff of the winning bid, that is the 
difference between their valuation Y; and the winning bid b,, since their utility is simply 
(v;- b,) they win, and 0 otheiWise, multiplied by the probability of making the highest 
bid. With a common rectangular distribution and independence, this probability is nb,"-1 
('). Each player thus maximizes 
H, = (v; - b;) nb;"" 1 (10) 
Taking the first derivative with respect to b;, and setting it equal to O,we have 
(11) 
This gives us 
2With a rectangular distribution F(v) = v for vE[O, 1], the probability that the first n-1 
players draw a value below b is b""1• This has to be multiplied by n, to allow for the 
possibi li ty that any of then players might have the top values (Phlips, 1988) 
(v1-b,) (n-l )- b; = 0 
b1 + ll(n-1) b1 = v1 
or 
b*1 = (n- lln) v1 
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(12) 
(i= l, ... ,n) 
This solution is the unique Nash equilibrium strategy to be played by each player. 
The person wi th the highest valuation makes the highest bid and is thus the winner. 
Therefore, given the assumptions previously made, the first-price sealed bid auction 
leads to pareto optimal results. B ecause of the independence of bidders' valuations, we 
can see here that i's bid does not depend on other players' valuations vi . Let us also 
notice here that as n increases, the equilibrium bids get closer to reservation values. If, 
for example, b1 = 0.5, and n = 2, then nb"-1= 1. Ifn = 3, then the probability of winning 
the bid becomes 0. 75 (Phlips, 1988). 
Past Work 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is an empirical technique often used to 
measure environmental benefits due to a change in a non-market good or environmental 
quality. This method has become one of the most widely used non-market valuation 
techniques over the past years. Its predominance is due to its flexibility and ability to 
estimate total value, including non-use value. 
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When using CVM, researchers generally agree that the use of the WTA format 
often leads to one important bias--the lack of upper bound in the minimum 
compensation demanded. Respondents tend to inflate their minimum compensation 
demanded (Cummings eta!., 1986). The disparity between WTA and WTP measures 
has been extensively documented and several explanations have been suggested. It is 
sometimes attributed to certain psychological factors. For example, Boyce eta!. (1992) 
explain it using the concept of intrinsic values. Individuals may want to preserve an 
environmental amenity for moral (or other) reasons. These values would appear more 
easily in WTA estimates than in WTP measures. 
Kahneman eta!. (1990) based their argument on an endowment or the "loss 
aversion" effect. The endowment effect states that an individual attributes a subjective 
value to gains and losses--winning 50 USD does not have the same value as losing 50 
SD. This effect exists when an individual becomes attached to the good because he or 
she is often rewarded for doing so in many contexts (Shogren eta!. , 1994). This 
attachment leads the respondent to overestimate her minimum WT A compared to her 
WTP. Shogren eta!. (1994) tested and rejected the hypothesis of an existing 
endowment effect. Rather, their resu Its seem to support the economic explanation of 
difference between WTA and WTP, provided by Hanemann (1991), who explained the 
divergence between the two measures in terms of substitution and income effects. The 
greater the income effect, and/or the smaller the substitution effect, the greater the 
disparity between WTP and WT A measures. As substitutability decreases, the trade-off 
between two goods x and y becomes less desirable, implying a greater disparity 
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between the two estimates. Cummings et a!. (1986) document six cases in which survey 
values for commodities ranging from hunting permits to cleaner air show disparities 
from about three to one up to ten to one in the ratio ofWTA to WTP. 
This well-documented difference between the two measures has had the direct 
effect of trying to avoid, whenever possib le, the use of the WTA estimate, especially in 
the case of public goods. 
Theory suggests that one way of forcing down WT A estimates is to put 
respondents in an auction setting. Few studies have been conducted to test for the 
difference in WT A values obtained in an auction setting compared with another setting, 
such as open-ended or dichotomous formats. Kumeuther et al. (1987) tested the use of a 
low bid auction in the case of the noxious facility location process, where the host 
community indicating the lowest bid obtains the facility and receives its bid as 
compensation. This compensation is financed by the other communities. Their findings 
show that the sealed bid auction dissuades communities from greatly exaggerating their 
compensation requirements. 
Coursey et al. (1987) explored the divergence in WT A values between two 
frames--the hypothetical WT A setting and the Vickrey, or second-price sealed bid 
auction setting. The commodity chosen for their experiment was a bitter-unpleasant 
taste experience, that of sucrose octa-acetate. Their result suggest that hypothetical 
measure of value obtained using WTA are likely to be biased upwards from values 
obtained from a market-like auction (Coursey eta!., 1987). Bishop and Heberlein 
(1986) found that deer hunters understated their actual WTA to sell deer-permits in a 
sealed bid auction setting, while hunters faced with simple dichotomous choice frame 
overstated their real WT A. 
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List and Shogren (1998) analyzed the effect of the use of an auction setting in the 
context of the selling price for Christmas gifts. Their results indicate that framing of the 
WTA estimates did not matter. Mean WT A estimates obtained with the hypothetical 
open-ended survey were not statistically different from estimates obtained form the 
hypothetical auction. Moreover, their findings suggest that respondents understated real 
WTA, whether in the hypothetical open-ended format or in the hypothetical auction 
setting. 
Application to the Preservation Program of Humid 
Zones on the Garonne River 
Description of the Situation 
We used the Contingent Valuation Survey conducted in the south of France in 
spring 1997 to estimate the cost of preserving humid zones along the Garonne River 
(Broadhead, 1997). Landowners were asked the minimum compensation they would 
have to receive in order for them to stop farming along the river. The population 
surveyed was 96 people, among whom were 39 farmers and 57 non-farmers. Half of 
the population sampled was placed in a "contingent auction" market. In order for the 
researcher to encourage participants to give their true minimum willingness to accept, 
owners were told that only the "bidders" with the lowest value would be considered. 
The survey was conducted by mail, and, for practical reasons, was a sealed bid auction. 
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Moreover, it was a first-price sealed bid auction, as owners would receive their own bid 
(or compensation demanded) if they were se lected. In the K.leindorfer and Sertel 
(1994) analysis of the auctioning of an indivisible public good, one agent of a 
community had to provide a public good, subject to compensation from the other 
agents. For each agent, the provision cost of the public good varied. This was also the 
case in the Kunreuther et a!. ( 1987) study of noxious facility siting. However, in this 
study, and like a "real world auction," it is the buyer who compensates the selected 
sellers. It is, to my knowledge, the first time such an experiment has been conducted. 
We now turn to the analysis of this game. 
Analysis 
The model used earlier in this paper can be used here. We must, however, redefine 
a number of aspects of the analysis. For example, the model of fust-price, sealed bid 
auction described previously deali with one seller and many buyers. In our case, we 
have one buyer, represented by the government, and many sellers, or more precisely the 
owners of the lots. Only owners with the smallest bids were selected. Fig. 3.1 shows a 
sample of the questionnaire given to participants. 
The compensation is paid by the French government. The use of the auction is 
very important since it helps the buyer to obtain more accurate information on the 
respondents' true wi llingness to accept values. As we have seen before, the use of the 
auction encourages respondents to give their lowest compensation possible. More 
formally, we are trying to get as close as possible to the equality v, = b,. 
A thorough study of the natural environmelll of the riverbanks has been 
conducted by biologists and ecologists. This study shows that converting 
only a part of the land along the Garonne River would suffice to restore 
an acceptable level ofbiodiversity and to protect the nawral environment. 
More precisely, it seems that restoring about 50% of the lots along the 
River would be enough. 
Th e effective compensation will be determined according to a threshold 
(chosen by considering the different costs indicated by all the owners 
concerned). We will g ive priority to the individuals asking f or the 
minimum compensations, until we obtain those 50% of the lots, in the 
limit of the allocated budget. 
Fig. 3.1 . Sample questionnaire given to participants. 
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Following the previous notations, the payoff function for individual i is H;(L)= 
b, - v,, where L represents the land considered 
In other words, the profit of player i is the compensation b, he/she receives in 
exchange for not farming on the land (for example, v, representing the value of the 
production of corn on the lot) . 
Defining b,* as the lowest bid, then each player is confronted with three possible 
payoffs: 
Ifb, < b;*, then player i receives b, - v, 
If b, > b;*, then player i receives 0 
The expected payoff for player i is 
EH, = (b; - vJ prob (b, < bJ> j • i) (13a) 
EH, = (b,- v;) n b,"· ' (13b) 
Taking the ftrst derivative with respect to b;, we obtain 
(b,- v,) (n-1) n bt'+ n bt' = 0 
Rearranging, we have 
(v; - b;) (1-n) n bt'- n bt' = 0 
(v; - b,) (1-n) - b; =0 
v, (1-n) + b, (n-2) = 0 
The equilibrium strategy is for player i to bid 
b*; = (n-1) V; /(n-2) (i= l , .. . ,n) 
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(14) 
(!Sa) 
(15b) 
(15c) 
( ! 6) 
Equilibrium bids get closer to reservation prices, or valuations, as n increases. Tn other 
words, when placed in a first-price sealed bid auction, respondents are encouraged to 
announce a compensation closer to their true WTA value as the number of panicipants 
increases. 
Results 
The average WTA value for owners who were in a competitive setting is lower 
than the average WTA value for owners not placed in a competitive setting. Results are 
described in Table 3.1. 
On average, farmers who were told only the lowest compensations would be 
considered indicated lower values. For farmers, the average compensation demanded 
amounted to about 500 USD, while the average compensation obtained with the other 
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half of the farmers' group was about 610 USD. Therefore, there was a difference of 
about 100 USD. For non-farmers, the difference amounted to 40 USD - 17 USD for 
those in the "auction setting," 57 USD for the others. However, these differences within 
each group (farmers and non-farmers, respectively) are not statistically significantly 
different at a = 0.1 0. 
We used the Heckman model and ran a regression using the binary variable 
"com," which stood for whether or not respondents were placed in the "auction selling." 
ACC = 0.27 FAR + 0.27 USE - 0.04 COM 
WTA = 2403.7 IN! + 2702.4 IN2 + 363 .7 PAR 
where ACC represents whether or not respondents accept to participate in the 
preservation program, FAR represents whether or not respondents are farmers, USE 
represents the total size of the parcels owned by the river, COM represents whether or 
not respondents were placed in the auction setting, WT A represents the respondents' 
minimum compensation demanded, IN!, and IN2 represents income, and PAR 
represents the number of parcels owned by respondents. 
Table 3.1 
Average WT A demanded by respondents 
Respondent WT A in compennve sening WT A with open-ended format 
Fanners 610 (USD) 500 (USD) 
. on-farmers 57 (USD) 17 (USD) 
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Table 3.2 shows the t-stats for the variable COM were not significant. Knowing 
that they participate in an auction did not mfluence respondents' answers as to whether 
or not they wanted to participate in the preservation program of the riverbanks. 
We then tested if the COM variable was significant in the second step, the least 
square regression of the Heckman model. Table 3.3 summarizes the findings. 
The t-stats for the variable COM were not significant. ln other words, the amount 
of compensation demanded by respondents was not affected by whether or not they 
were placed in an auction setting. It is consistent with our earlier findings, which 
indicate the absence of significant difference between mean WTA estimates when 
respondents are faced with the auction setting and those answering open-ended 
question. 
These results would indicate that lando,vners gave their "true" WT A values when 
placed in the open-ended question fonnat. This conclusion is consistent with List and 
Table 3.2 
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation for the 
COM variable 
Heckman 2-step Estimated coefficient t ~s tatistic 
Pro bit 
FAR .27 2.8 
USE .2 7 2.7 
COM -.04 -.4 
Two-stage least square 
IN! 2403.7 2.1 
!N2 2702.4 2.2 
PAR 363.7 3.0 
Table 3.3 
Results of the Heckman 2-step procedure estimation 
using COM as a variable 
Heckman 2-step Estimated coefficient t-statistic 
Pro bit 
FAR .4 1.3 
USE ·.7 ·2.9 
Two-stage least square 
IN! 2403.7 2.1 
IN2 2702.4 2.2 
COM ·582.2 ·.4 
PAR 3 18.3 2.1 
Shogren's (1998) findings. The framing of the question did not seem to affect 
individuals' behavior. In other words, CVM can be successfully used using the open-
question format in the case of compensation demanded. 
Conclusions 
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The majority of CVM studies involving WT A estimation indicate that individuals 
have a tendency to overestimate their minimum compensation. This conclusion has 
traditionally been reached when comparing WTA and WTP measures. Several 
explanations have been suggested, such as a psychological (loss aversion effect) and 
economic (substitution and income effects). As pointed out by Hanemann (1991), there 
is no evidence that both measures should, in theory, be equivalent. 
This paper tested for the accuracy of the respondents' WT A values by comparing 
WT A estimates in two distinct settings. In the first setting, respondents were asked to 
state their minimum compensation demanded using an open question fonnat , while in 
the second setting, individuals were informed that only those indicating the lowest 
compensation would be selected to participate in the preservation program (auction 
setting). 
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This hypothetical auction mechanism is interesting in that it discourages 
respondents with high values to participate in the preservation program. In other words, 
the auction setting leads to a self-selection of the respondents. Moreover, theory 
predicts that the first-price sealed bid auction setting does lead respondents to ask for 
compensations closer to their true value. Moreover, it indicates that the greater the 
number of participants, the closer to their true value the compensation demanded will 
be. 
Results indicate that even though lower average compensations were obtained for 
both groups (farmers and non-farmers), we fail to reject the hypothesis that revealed 
values in the two different settings are derived from the same parental population. This 
result is confirmed by the non-significance of the variable "competition" in both the 
first and the second-step of the Heckman procedure. The auction setting did not lead 
respondents to indicate lower compensation values, nor did it discourage respondents to 
participate in the preservation program. 
These results lead to the conclusion that respondents gave their true WT A value in 
the open format and did not overestimate the compensation demanded. We must, 
however, reiterate that throughout the pages, we have made some rather strong 
assumptions, in panticular symmetries among bidders, common knowledge of the 
probability distributions, and absence of risk aversion. 
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More generally, this paper shows tha the use of auctions can be successfully 
applied to the provision of public goods. This finding is important in that it allows 
researchers to use the WT A measure whenever this format is the only one that can be 
app lied for property rights issues or political reasons. 
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CHAPTER4 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study was undertaken with the primary purpose being to assess the welfare 
loss to landowners from the implementation of a preservation program along the 
Garonne River. 
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The analysis indicates that the WT A format can be used to estimate welfare loss. 
Moreover, the Heckman binary/continuous model appears not to lead to exaggerated 
estimates, since WT A figures elicited existing market values. This result is also 
confirmed by the rather large number of zero bids obtained. It is important, however, to 
add that respondents had a thorough knowledge of the good itself and its value to them 
-- this is particularly true for farmers--and the proposed preservation program was 
realistic. Respondents believed in the applicability of the program, which then does not 
represent a vague and improbable possibility. 
Finally, this study sheds some light on the reasons why some respondents refused 
to participate in the preservation program. We were able to differentiate those who were 
indifferent to the program from those opposed it. This information provides some 
important policy insights. For instance, many respondents admitted being interested in 
the program, but suggested some variations, or else preferred some other means of 
compensation (for example, technical advice on how to maintain riparian land). 
Similarly, protest responses may, in some cases, be of valuable interest in future studies 
as they indicate that respondents' refusal to participate is not as much linked to the good 
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itself but to the "administration" part of it. This is particularly true fo r respondents who 
emitted strong reservations toward the governmental agency or the feasibility of the 
program itself. It would be of valuable interest in any WTP study to be able to 
differentiate these answers from other zero WTP bids. 
Another important aim to this study was to test for the accuracy of the 
respondents' WT A values by using an hypothetical auction setting. We tested for the 
accuracy of the respondents' WT A values by comparing WTA estimates in two distinct 
settings. In the first setting, respondents were asked to state their minimum 
compensation demanded using an open question format, while in the second setting, 
individuals were informed that only those indicating the lowest compensation wou ld be 
selected to participate in the preservation program (auction setting). 
This hypothetical auction mechanism is interesting in that it discourages 
respondents with high values to participate in the preservation program. in other words, 
the auction setting leads to a self-selection of the respondents. Theory predicts that the 
first-price, sealed bid auction setting does lead respondents to ask for compensations 
closer to their true value. Moreover, it indicates that the greater the number of 
participants, the closer to their true value the compensation demanded will be. 
Resu lts indicate that even though we obtained lower average compensations, for 
both groups considered (farmers and non-farmers), we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
revealed values in the two different settings are derived from the same parental 
population. This result is confirmed by the non-significance of the variable 
"competition" in both the first and the second step ofthe Heckman procedure. The 
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auction setting did not lead respondents to indicate lower compensation values, nor did 
it discourage respondents to participate in the preservation program. 
These results confirm the conclusions we had reached in our first paper. We can 
conclude that respondents gave their true WT A value in the open fonnat and did not 
overestimate the compensation demanded. 
More generally, it shows that the use of auctions can be successfully applied to 
the provision of public goods. This finding is important in that it allows researchers to 
use the WT A measure whenever this format is the only one that can be applied for 
property rights issues or political reasons. 
75 
APPENDICES 
76 
Appendix A: 
Map of France 
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Appendix B: 
Restoration of the Riparian Forest Along the Garonne 
River Between Portet and Malause Questionnaire 
(Contingent Evaluation) 
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RESTORATION OF THE RlP A.RlAN FOREST ALO G THE GARONNE 
RIVER BETWEE PORTET AND Mi\LAUSE 
(CONTINGENT EVALUATION) 
by B&B Consulting 
March 1997 
Quesiionnaire for non-jam1ers. 
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Precise date of the survey: ______________________ _ 
Place where the survey was conducted:------- -----------
Place of the lots you own along the Garonne River: __________ (County) 
The riparian forests along the Garonne River plays an important role in 
V' stabilizing the banks 
V' decreasing ground erosion 
V' decreasing water pollution 
V' the reproduction and migration of the different species, such as the salmon, the 
heron . . 
If we want that different animal and vegetal species prosper in their natural environment, 
we must recreate a natural habitat favorable to their development. It would therefore be 
of interest to convert a strip of land of sufficient size to that effect. 
We can preserve sites by creating natural reserves, by limiting their access to the public on 
some sites, or by creating more or Jess accessible wooded areas. 
The Ministry of the Environment conducted a survey on the benefits associated with 
maintaining natural habitat along the Garorme River, between Porte! and Moissac. This 
study allowed us to predict an estimated budget for the preservation program of the habitat 
for ten years. 
We are now trying to define some "maintenance contracts" in which you would voluntarily 
undertake to respect some practices on the riverbanks, in exchange for a financial 
compensation. This is precisely on the financial modalities of these contracts that we are 
presently asking for your help. 
The information that you can give us is very important in that it will help us choose a 
particular preservation program. 
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First, we would like to knowbener your current use of the lots you own on the ri verbanks. 
Please cross the right answer(s) when necessary. 
I. How many hectares of land do you own in total? ____________ _ 
2. How many lots do you own by the ri ver? _______________ _ 
3. What is the total area of these lots? --------------- hectares 
4. What is the linear of these lots? _________________ meters 
5. Are those lots adjacent? Yes/no 
6. Describe the general appearance of the ri verbanks on these lots: 
banks small 
slope small 
high steep 
7. How do you use these lots? 
Habitat/lending for farming/woods (which ones)/nothing/others 
8. Do you currently use these lots up to the water level? Yes/no, why 
9. (You don ' t use these lots up to the water level. ) Do you upkeep this strip of land 
unused? 
I 0. (You don ' t use these lots up to the water level.) What is the width of this strip ofland? 
We are interested in a strip of land that could be from I 0 to 50 meters large on the 
riverbanks. Different programs of preservation are possible. Each one of these programs 
supposes different levels of participation from you, and therefore, different compensations. 
The duration of these programs extends over a period of l 0 years, renewable. The 
government, the owner and the eventual farmer commit themselves by written. The 
contract signed is attached to the land. In other words, even if the lot is sold, the next 
owner has to respect the contract. In the case where the lot is rented for farming, a contract 
is signed between the owner and the farmer. [ ... ] 
If, at the end of this period, you wish to convert back that strip ofland to its previous use, 
the costs associated to the conversion (investment in time and material) is taken care by 
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the government or its representative. If you are satisfied with the program and wish, at the 
end of 10 years, to keep it, a new contract is then signed. ( ... ] 
We are now going to present to you three programs. We are asking you what would be the 
minimum compensation that you should receive for you to accept to participate to those 
programs. These programs would not question the existing rights of irrigation, and 
pumping. 
MONETARY COMPENSATION 
We envisage the payment of a compensation per hectare, conditional on the choice of a 
program. 
Program 1: No upkeep 
You provide the land. The strip of land allocated to the program is not to be kept up . Its 
width is between I 0 and 50 meters. This protected zone would allow for preservation and 
reproduction of different species. 
Program 2: Upkeep of a trail 
You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide traiL This trail may be used by 
hunters, fishermen, or hikers. The upkeep of the trail is your responsibility. The width of 
this strip of land is between I 0 and 50 meters. 
Program 3: Upkeep+ wood 
You provide the land. You maintain a 3 meters wide trail at your charge. You plant the 
trees and bushes which are supplied to you and you are responsible for the upkeep of the 
land twice a year. The upkeep consists of clearing brushwood, getting rid of dead wood 
and garbage. The heavy upkeep work (e.g. cutting trees) is also your responsibility, but 
the wood belongs to you. 
11 . To which one of this program(s) would you accept to participate? 
Program I 
program 2 
program 3 
none 
12. (You accept to participate to several programs.) Which program do you prefer? 
Program 1 
program 2 
program 3 
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13. (You accept to participate to a program.) What would be the strip of land width you 
would accept to allocate to this program? meters 
14. What is the minimum compensation that you would have to receive to participate in 
this program? ___ francs 
15. (You refuse to participate to a program.) Can you briefly indicate the reasons of your 
refusal? ____________________________ _ 
16. Is the duration of the program inconvenient to you? Yes/no 
17. If yes, what would be a more convenient duration of the program for you? ____ _ 
18. (You refuse to participate in a program.) Let's suppose that the owners of the lots 
adjacent to your(s) accept to participate in one of these programs. Will their decision 
have an impact on your activity on your lot(s)? Yes/no 
19. (You refuse to participate in a program.) Let 's suppose that the owners of the lots 
adjacent to your(s) accept to participate in one of these programs. Would their 
decision affect your choice? Yes/no 
IfYes,why? ______________________ ___ 
To conclude this survey, we are now going to ask you some personal questions. These 
questions are important because they allow us to improve the quality of the analysis. Your 
answers will stay confidential and anonymous. They will be used to the sole purpose of 
data treatment. 
20. Have you already participated in agri-environmental programs? Yes/no 
If yes, which ones? ________________________ _ 
21. Do you contribute to an association? Yes (environmental; humanitarian; hunting, 
fishing; others )/no 
22. Do you sometimes undertake actions to clean the river or upkeep its banks? Yes/no 
83 
23 . Do you own some land along some other riverbanks? Yes/no 
24. Gender: female/male 
25. Year of birth: _ __ _ 
26. Current family situation: married, cohabitation; single; divorced; widow 
27. Schooling: before high-school/high-school/ high-school + 2or + 3; above 
28. umber of persons living with you (including you):------------
29. umberofcmlmen: __________________________ __ 
30. umber of dependents: -----------------------------------------
3 1. Occupation: senior executive/ middle manager/ factory worker/ employee! retired/ 
other 
32. Total net monthly income of the household. 
less than I IOOOF 
I I 000-18000 
more than !8000-40000F 
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Appendix C: 
CVM Studies 
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Table C. I 
Some of the CVM studies listed by Mitchell and Carson (1989) 
Sample SIZe 
Year survey Research (usable sample WTPor 
Study Good being valued conducted procedure used in parentheses) WTA 
Anderson and Devereaux Artificial fi shing 1985 ML, TLP, PI 201 (55) WTP 
(1986) reef 
Brokshire and Randall Elk hunting 1977, 1978 PI 108 WTP, 
(1980) WTA 
Burnes et al . (1983) Disposal of tox1c 1982 PI 74, 84 WTP 
wastes 
Conrad and Leblanc Development rights PI 22 WTA 
(1979) 
D'Arge (19 5) Water quality PI 20 WTP, 
WTA 
Dtckie et al. ( 1979) Price comparison 1974 PI 72 WTP 
information for 
supermarkets 
FoSter et al. ( 1982) Agricultural land 1981 PI 85 IVTP 
HalStead ( 1984) Non-market values PI 85 WTP 
of agnculturalland 
Johnson et al. ( 1986) Whue water 1984 ML 300,300 WTP, 
recreation (193, 200) WTA 
Jones-Lee ( 1976) Value of life 1975 ML 30 WTP, 
WTA 
Oster ( 1977) Freshwater 1973, 1974 TLP 200 IVTP 
pollution 
Roberts et al. (1985) Offshore d1V1ng 1982 ML, PI , TLP 144 IVTP 
platforms 
ML = Mail 
TLP • Telephone 
PI ... Personal interview 
WTA = Willingness to accept 
WTP ... Willingness to pay 
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